Air Traffic Controller Staffing, Retirement, and Fatigue Issues

According to the FAA’s most recent “Administrator’s Fact Book,” published in December 2006, there are 14,206 air traffic controllers working in the United States. 

That represents a drop in controller staffing levels for the third straight year and provides a strong indication that despite the FAA’s attempts to hire the next generation workforce to offset the long-expected retirement wave that has now arrived, the agency is losing more controllers than it is hiring. This is mostly due to the FAA’s imposed work rules and pay bands that have removed any incentive for veteran controllers to either transfer to busier facilities in need of more controllers or even to stay in the workforce altogether.

A 30 percent pay cut for new controllers and reduced pay bands are also forcing many of the agency’s new hires to reconsider their career plans. Over 60 new hires have resigned since June 2006. One new controller in Memphis just recently left to start a lawn mowing business because it provided a higher salary. Two Department of Defense controllers turned down job offers at the FAA control facility in Louisville, Ky., because it would have meant a $20,000 pay cut.

Even FAA management officials at the facility level are acknowledging that veteran controllers are leaving sooner than ever upon reaching retirement eligibility, thereby depleting available ranks of fully certified controllers and also removing the on-the-job trainers to assist with the development of new hires. Below is a report on the situation at Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center, from FAA supervisor Ed Macknight, who wrote the following on a supervisor’s web site known as SUPCOM:

“At ZDC, they are bailing at first opportunity which is a marked change from 2 years ago. Even with a mass arrival of CTI (Controller Training Initiative) students, we are way behind the curve. We also have had new students resign, transfer out of the FAA, or just not accept the job at all. Never, ever saw that prior to this past year.

“Overtime is available almost every week to those who wish to work it. Holdover is a daily occurrence. It all reminds me greatly of FAA circa 1983-1987, when I recall that constant 6 day weeks were very fatiguing and led to other issues at home and at work.”

As for the FAA’s imposed work rules and pay bands removing incentives for controllers to want to seek a transfer to a larger, busier air traffic facility, where their services are desperately needed, such as Atlanta Hartsfield Tower (ATL), an FAA manager at Providence Tower (PVD) named Ed Angel wrote the following on SUPCOM:

“We have a controller at PVD (ATC 8) who was offered a job at ATL.  It was not a paid move, and he was offered a 1% pay raise.  That raise came before locality. So after locality is figured in, he will take a $4,000 pay cut, and lose the rest of his CIP on the go (another 4%).   His new pay would be in the lower half on the ATL pay band, so there was room to actually offer him a pay raise, and still be within the new band.  Of course this employee had to decline the offer.  Can anyone blame him??

“ATL missed out a a controller who I think would be successful at any ATC facility.”

The FAA “Administrator’s Fact Book” reports that the total number of controllers at the FAA’s 314 air traffic control facilities dropped from a high of 15,386 in September 2003 to 14,736 by October 2004 as the long-expected controller retirement wave began to increase in size.  The total fell again, to 14,227, at the end of fiscal year 2005. The 14,206 total is listed as being current as of Oct. 31, 2006, taking into account hiring and attrition statistics a full month into the current, 2007 fiscal year. 

Controllers are currently leaving the workforce through retirements, resignations and promotions to FAA supervisor positions (where there exists the only possibility of a pay increase due to the imposed pay bands) at a rate of three per day since the start of the current fiscal year; a total of 467 through March 1, 2007, according to NATCA’s facility-by-facility research. This is ahead of the FAA’s projected pace of attrition for FY07.

Overall, the FAA has missed its retirement projections for three straight fiscal years, by an increasing margin each year, as the information below shows:

FISCAL YEAR 2004

FAA-projected retirements: 329

(SOURCE: Page 9 of a PowerPoint presentation by FAA Administrator Marion Blakey in December 2004, produced after the original FAA Workforce Plan was released publicly.)

Actual retirements: 362

(SOURCE: Page 9 of the same PowerPoint presentation; also found in the graph at the top of page 32 in the updated workforce plan (released in August 2006).)

FISCAL YEAR 2005

FAA-projected retirements: 341

(SOURCE: Page 32 of the updated FAA workforce plan (dated June 06 but released in August 06)

Actual retirements: 465

(SOURCE: Page 32 of the updated FAA workforce plan)

FISCAL YEAR 2006 (Oct. 1, 2005 – Sept. 30, 2006)

FAA-projected retirements: 467

(SOURCE: Page 32 of the updated FAA workforce plan)

Actual retirements, according to FAA: 583

(SOURCE: FAA internal documents and attributed comments in media accounts)

FISCAL YEAR 2007 (Oct. 1, 2006 – Sept. 30, 2007)

FAA-projected retirements: 643

(SOURCE: Page 32 of the updated FAA workforce plan)

Actual retirements as of March 1, 2007, according to NATCA research: 351

The reason for the high number of retirements thus far in FY07 is clearly the FAA’s imposed work rules and pay bands on the controller workforce; something that NATCA never agreed to and which cannot under any definition be accurately referred to as a “contract.”

Even the FAA has admitted that the imposed work rules and pay bands are exacerbating the retirement crisis. Furthermore, the Department of Transportation Inspector General reaffirmed this in its Feb. 9, 2007 report on controller staffing, stating on page 7 that, “Beginning in April 2006, actual retirements began exceeding FAA’s projections when negotiations between the Agency and NATCA over a new collective bargaining agreement reached an impasse. … By September, when FAA began unilaterally implementing its own proposals for open Articles, actual retirements were nearly three times higher than FAA had projected (97 actual retirements compared to 39 projected). According to FAA officials, the large jump in actual retirements was a result of the breakdown in contract talks. In our opinion, those events underscore the need for FAA to refine its methodology to consider future events that could trigger a similar reaction. For example, there may be a significant jump in controller retirements during January 2007 when many controllers will see a reduction in their pay checks as FAA begins phasing out Controller Incentive Pay. This one-time event could adversely impact the retirement estimates for 2007 and beyond.”

The FAA’s about-face on the impact of the imposed work rules and pay bands on the retirement crisis is remarkable, given the Agency’s vehement public denials in early 2006 that such an outcome would occur. Both the FAA Administrator and her chief public spokesperson used strong language in flatly denying that controllers would ever feel as though they had no incentive to leave. Yet under the FAA’s imposed work rules and pay bands, over 90 percent of veteran controllers will never see another raise. If they retired today, they would get the annual cost of living raise afforded federal employees. But if they stay in the FAA, they do not receive that raise under the imposed pay rules. Combine that with the fact that controllers cannot take leave in the summertime – when their kids are out of school – because of understaffing, cannot take a guaranteed break after two strenuous hours on position at a time and cannot leave the facility to get a cup of coffee and relax in fresh air without taking vacation time to do so, and the FAA has now given controllers EVERY reason to leave the profession. And these veterans are indeed leaving in record numbers, at levels far exceeding Agency projections.

Rather than ‘staffing to traffic’ as the FAA states publicly is its new mission, the agency appears to be following a new policy; ‘staffing to budget.” And what concerns NATCA the most is that no amount of new hires the agency has made over the past two years or will make over the next few years is going to fix the current staffing problem. That’s because it takes an average of three years to train a new controller before that professional is fully certified. The FAA is currently hiring trainees; it is not hiring controllers.

That gap, from the day a veteran controller retires to the day their replacement reaches full certification level, is where we have the most reason to worry about the agency’s continued ability to maintain the margin of safety in the system by ensuring there is redundancy. Our greatest challenge today, besides the distraction of the imposed work rules, is maintaining the margin of safety knowing the level of redundancy has been whittled away to its bare minimum. We need more eyes watching the skies.

While there is less margin for error than ever before, efficiency is suffering too. Controllers working in en route centers are having to put more space between planes to keep them safe because of low staffing.  Controllers have flight strips and other documentation that clearly indicates that staffing is the cause of some flow control restrictions.

We acknowledge that the FAA is hiring more controllers than in years past. However, to repeat, it will take three years for these new hires to be fully trained and able to sit down and work traffic by themselves. That’s a big problem. We needed those hires to be made at least three years ago so they could step in today for the retiring controllers. Second, we are currently working to find out how many of the new hires have turned down the job because we have substantial anecdotal evidence to suggest the 30 percent pay cut the FAA forced through, combined with the imposed work rules have led many to choose another line of work.

NATCA officials have personally visited with new hires at the FAA’s training academy in Oklahoma City and report that they are not happy about the current state of the FAA. Many military controllers are staying in the Department of Defense as well, rather than pursue FAA employment that in many cases means as much as a $20,000 annual pay cut. The current crop of trainees is also coming to the FAA without any military or CTI experience. NATCA Executive Vice President Paul Rinaldi visited with Academy recruits on Feb. 26-27 and reports that approximately 80 percent of them are “off the street,” meaning no formal education at a CTI school or military training or service.

FAA Officials Say There Is A Staffing Problem

NATCA is not alone in reporting an understaffing problem in the controller ranks. FAA supervisors and managers and other officials report that as well.

At Fort Myers Tower in Florida, FAA management sent out a memorandum on Feb. 20, 2007 that addressed the issue of forced overtime after a controller’s shift has ended, stating, “you are employed in an occupation where holdover OT is becoming quite routine. Your shift work and overtime assignments are included as conditions of employment.” Then, in denying the requests of at two controllers to be excluded from mandatory overtime to attend to child care issues, the FAA memo states, “You must understand that the facility has a need for your services that may conflict with your childcare routine.”

Clearly, staffing is a problem at that facility or else mandatory overtime would not be needed.

On Jan. 10, 2007, FAA Regional Administrator Douglas R. Murphy, in denying a hardship transfer of a New York TRACON controller to another facility via a letter to Congressman Lynn Westmoreland, wrote, “With limited incoming resources, it is imperative for N90 to maintain adequate staffing due to losses resulting from retirements, transfers, training failures, etc. Since only about 50 percent of the persons in training assigned to N90 progress to a fully certified level, it is necessary to retain all individuals that we anticipate will be successful.”

Last December, FAA Deputy Administrator Robert Sturgell told Gannett News Service that “Atlanta's tower is understaffed.” That would be Atlanta Hartsfield, the busiest tower in the world. If the FAA cannot even keep its busiest tower properly staffed, we believe that is a symptom of this large, nationwide problem.

The relationship between understaffing and safety, fatigue and productivity

At the Southern California TRACON (SCT), traffic is up beyond pre-9/11 levels, to a point where they are handing 2.2 million operations per year.  Meanwhile, the facility is operating with only 188 of its authorized 261 controllers, and they are being told that the Palm Springs facility, along with its 220,000 annual operations, will be consolidated into SCT. Meanwhile, and not coincidentally, the number of operational errors at the Southern California TRACON was eight in 2004, and it has grown to 22 in 2006. That represents a near 300 percent increase in operational errors over a two year period as the staffing levels have dropped.

Air traffic controllers’ concern is that we are pushing the controller workforce to the breaking point and we can't afford for it to break.  We have so few controllers at some of these facilities, like the Southern California TRACON where we are short 73 controllers, that there is no margin for error.  Controllers are people, and things happen to people – they get sick, or there is a family emergency and they have to take a sudden and unexpected leave of absence. With staffing so critically low, and with retirements at their current rate, we don’t see how we can keep this up before real tragedy strikes.

The situation is so dire at Southern California TRACON that the FAA has had no choice but to place new trainees – straight out of CTI programs or off the street – into the facility to rush them into the training process and desperately work to try and get them to full performance level within three years. This is an extremely reckless and dangerous course. Until now, Southern California TRACON was a destination for experienced controllers, not a starting point for new controllers, because of the incredible complexity of the operation. SCT is the busiest TRACON in the United States. Veteran controllers there didn’t start at that facility, they moved through the system, graduating from less busy facilities and gaining valuable experience before earning a well-deserved promotion to SCT. But because of the staffing crisis, controllers do not move up through the system anymore because their current facilities couldn’t afford to lose that person. So the FAA is putting brand-new trainees – with no prior experience at an FAA facility – at Southern California TRACON. This is like taking a high school baseball player and putting them in the starting lineup for the New York Yankees and expecting them to play error-free baseball and hit a home run every day.

At the world’s busiest airport control tower – Atlanta Hartsfield – the situation is bleak. The tower is authorized by the FAA to be staffed with 55 controllers. Yet currently, there are only 34 veteran, fully-trained controllers on staff. Twelve of them (35 percent) are eligible to retire this year and nine of those have declared that they will indeed leave the workforce this year. There are only five trainees on board. So far in FY07, the facility has lost four veteran controllers to retirement. To put the situation in perspective, the tower has 11 fewer fully certified controllers than O’Hare Tower in Chicago, yet works slightly more traffic than ORD. And ORD is also understaffed by 12 controllers, by the way.

The understaffing at Atlanta is causing the workforce to suffer a tremendous burden of fatigue and burnout. This has potentially dire consequences for safety.  “If a controller is working 15 planes at the same time, and you’re on #15, you don’t want the controller to forget you,” said Atlanta controller Gary Brittain.  “But when I talk to my colleagues, I hear the exhaustion in their voices and see the fatigue in their eyes and in their faces. 

On Jan. 10, a controller cleared Delta Flight 1606 for takeoff, without realizing that the runway was not in the proper configuration for departing flights. It was an erroneous clearance. The Delta jet began its takeoff roll and got up to nearly full speed, 140 knots. At the last moment before takeoff, the controller, having caught his own error, instructed the pilots to abort the takeoff. The plane did stop, but in applying the brakes in a very hard fashion, it blew out multiple tires on the aircraft and resulted in very hot brakes. The plane exited the runway but could not get back to the gate. Passengers were taken off the aircraft out on the airport field and taken back to the gate in buses. There were no injuries and no fire, thankfully.

The FAA took disciplinary action against two controllers in the tower, decertifying them. An FAA supervisor researching the event verbally disciplined the two controllers involved, and told them that if the aircraft had gotten airborne that it would have been 'catastrophic.’ Controllers regularly work more than six hours per day on position, well above safe levels that had been in place since World War II but scrapped by the FAA in its imposed work rules last September. Atlanta controllers routinely are forced to work almost three straight hours at a time without a break, 50 percent longer than what is widely regarded as a safe period of work on position.

As for the Jan. 10 incident, it was ironic that the decertification of the controllers involved was only to occur if the performance was deemed seriously deficient, yet the certification process was only a few hours long The FAA told a local Atlanta TV station that the incident was not serious and did not jeopardize safety. However, the NTSB investigation team was on site almost immediately to look into the incident, a first in Brittain’s 28-year career. The fire and crash crews were called out to investigate all the smoke.  The aircraft had to be repaired on the taxiway before it could even move.

At New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport Control Tower, flights are at record high levels:

1999:  355,677 operations

2000:  358,951

2001: 317,746

2002: 301,160

2003:  291,299

2004:  332,816

2005:  362,680

2006:  396,734

2007:   37,108 through January, meaning a projected yearly total of 450,000-475,000

As shown, the JFK Tower traffic count is up considerably since 9/11. Conversely the controller staffing level is down 30 percent during that same period.  Common sense suggests safety and efficiency should dictate a 30 percent increase of the tower’s pre-9/11 authorized staffing numbers considering the FAA’s motto is, “the safe, efficient, expeditious movement of air traffic.” Yet, the FAA’s “new” plan has ceased the practice of staffing to traffic but instead, staffing to its budget. 

In 2006, JFK Tower lost four veteran controllers. This year, another three will leave; and as many as eight have expressed their desire to retire. Five of these retirements are mandatory (age 56) by 2008.  That equates to more than a 40% reduction in staffing.  While we are encouraged by management’s intent to hire three controllers this year, they will not be fully certified until 2009 or later. During that two-plus year period, even more controllers will be retiring, thus putting JFK even further behind the eight ball.

First-Hand Accounts From Controllers Choosing To Leave the FAA

Many air traffic controllers who have either retired early (before the mandatory age of 56) or resigned, all because of the FAA’s imposed work rules and pay bands, have chosen to express their thoughts on paper. Below are excerpts from five of these letters that NATCA has obtained:

Albuquerque Air Route Traffic Control Center
Resigned October 16, 2006

“I am hereby resigning from the FAA effective the 16th of October 2006.  I am returning to my previous position with Midwest ATC Services.  After comparing my experiences with both employers, the choice was simple.  Under the FAA’s new imposed work rules I can not justify staying with the agency.  I do not feel I can continue to work in an environment that is so vindictive or for an employer who is more worried about the bottom line rather than safety.

“My take home pay will go up, my quality of life will improve, and my workload will decrease.  My only regret is the time I have wasted making this move to Albuquerque, coupled with expense, only to find out I will not be making the money that the FAA told me I would be making.  This was the number one factor that prompted my decision to take what I thought would be a career with the FAA.  Therefore, this new pay scale is the number one reason for my leaving the FAA.”

New York Terminal Radar Approach Control
From a former Navy air traffic controller
Resigned February 28, 2007

“I am writing to regretfully inform you that I’m resigning my position as an air traffic control specialist at the New York TRACON effective close of business February 28, 2007.

“The pay and compensation changed dramatically from the time I submitted my application until I was hired in November 2006.  While much of what transpired between the FAA and NATCA in the intervening time does not concern me, the reduction in pay has had a dramatic negative effect on my ability to remain in this profession. 

“The cost of living in New York is too great to survive adequately on the new pay scale.  I have explored every alternative, including forgoing health coverage to save the additional money.  I therefore find myself facing one of the most difficult decisions of my life; to leave the career that I love to regain financial stability.”

Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center
Retired October 2, 2006

“Solely as a result of what I perceive to be hostile and intolerable working conditions, I have elected to retire from my position as an air traffic controller effective Monday, October 2, 2006.  Although it would be financially beneficial to continue working until the mandatory retirement age (56), recent well-documented changes in the national and local work environment have compelled me to accelerate my retirement plans.

“After learning of some of the details of the FAA’s “best and final offer” back in late July, I elected to begin the process of preparing my retirement forms.  Even as I did so I continued to hold out hope that a more fair and rational agreement could be reached.  Unfortunately for all parties on September 3, 2006 the FAA elected to impose the terms of what is becoming known among controllers as the ‘Non-Tract’.”

Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center
Resigned after less than a year on the job

“I was hired well over a year ago by the FAA.  My initial hire letter stated that I would have a salary of almost $46,000, which included locality.  Upon completion of my A sides, I was told I would receive a raise of approximately $20,000, which would be given to me within about two months.  Throughout the course of my first year and completion of my D sides, I was told I was going to get additional raises, which by the end of my first year would put me at over $90,000.

“Before I left for Oklahoma, I purchased a townhouse in New Hampshire close to the center, basing my budget on all the figures I had previously been told.  I left a job in Florida, where I was making a considerable amount of money, but based on all the benefits of the FAA and the salary I was promised, not to mention how much I loved the opportunity of starting such an amazing profession, how could I be anything but ecstatic about what was about to happen.

“Shortly after arriving to the center I sat in on a briefing where I learned that there were many changes being forced on all the controllers, taking away and changing their benefits.  When the topic of pay came up no concrete answers were given.  It was a series of "I don't know's" or "They'll be a pay briefing in a few weeks." 

“During my initial group meeting with Fran Bujak, the Director of Training, he asked if we had any questions or concerned.  Half-joking I said, "Yea, how am I going to pay my mortgage?"  He said that I wasn't looking at the big picture.  I was told that in 3-5 years when I am fully checked out and after nights, Sunday pay, holidays and locality, I would be making around $82,000.  With no warning I went from making $90,000 in the first year to $82,000 after three to five years.  Then he basically said if anyone doesn't like it they could leave.  The comment wasn't directed at me, and it was said rather nonchalantly, but it got me thinking. 

“No one could justify to me the fact that trainees who had been there a year were making over $90,000 and frozen there, but it would take me three to five years to get even close to that number and after being fully checked out I wouldn't even reach that.  I chose this career because it is highly rewarding and there is so much responsibility, but I also wanted to be financially secure.  In order to make ends meet I would have to get a second job, which would be nearly impossible, due to the fact that my schedule would constantly fluctuate and there is so much to learn the first few months I felt I would get behind.  Mainly I took this job and moved up North to have a better way of life and to be able to see my family.  Working seven days a week and struggling to pay my bills is not a way I feel comfortable living.  If there was a light at the end of the tunnel I would suck it up, but there seems to be no one who can give me a definite answer about the future, and after being mislead from the beginning I wouldn't know what to believe anymore.” 

Albuquerque Air Route Traffic Control Center

“In November 2005, I accepted an offer to work for the Federal Aviation Administration.  I voluntarily left the Department of Defense, resulting in a reduction in pay and benefits.  However, I was expecting that as outlined in my initial offer I could anticipate seeing this as temporary and I would be able to progress through training and receive compensation accordingly.

“Having completed my training in Oklahoma, I arrived at Albuquerque ARTCC to begin training as an En Route Controller.  As I was training, I was watching what was developing between the Agency and the Union regarding contract negotiations.  The entire time, I and other developmentals were informed that we would be “grandfathered” in and would not be negatively impacted with our pay, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations.

“I began to understand that the Agency had no intention of protecting developmental pay.  We were informed in April that the negotiations had reached an impasse and the final offers were sent to Congress.  I was able to locate and interpret the information and began to worry that I might not be compensated in accordance with what I had expected when I transferred to the FAA.  As the developmentals began to ask about our pay, management at the facility level became resentful for our inquiries.  It appears to me that we were not “allowed” to ask what we would make and that there might be reprisal.  I have never been treated so badly by an employer.  It should be appropriate for an employee to ask what they will be paid or compensated.  People have families to feed and decisions to make.

“In June I began to seek a transfer back to my position at the DoD.  I was not surprised that the DoD immediately provided me with all pay and benefits information when I requested them.”

How The FAA’s Imposed Work Rules Are Destroying Workforce Morale, Diminishing the Margin of Safety and Creating a Divide between Controllers and FAA Management

The FAA is doing significant harm to the once proud and beloved profession of air traffic control with its imposed, jailhouse-like work rules for air traffic controllers. The imposed work rules are causing strife between employees and management, decimating staffing levels by driving out veteran controllers at a record pace and destroying morale in the facilities. Here are some examples of what is occurring:

• At Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center, on March 2, 2007, an air traffic controller called the facility from home to request sick leave.  The controller was running a fever and vomiting.  An FAA supervisor denied the request – twice.  The controller reported for work as directed. But 90 minutes later, the controller vomited on the sector while attempting to work live traffic.  The employee was then released on sick leave. On the very same shift on this same day, an FAA supervisor also called in to request sick leave. FAA management approved the request.

• The FAA, upon imposing its work rules last September, banned all radios in control towers – even weather radios – despite the fact that controllers used them to monitor local weather bulletins provided by local stations and the Emergency Broadcast System. Specifically, tornado warnings were crucial for controllers to hear about since no technology was available to them in the tower to spot tornadoes.
  
  But just days after the radio ban took effect, a severe weather system spawned tornadoes near both DuPage Tower in Illinois and Lincoln Tower in Nebraska  With FAA management having removed radios from all towers under the imposed work rules, neither facility’s controllers knew of the impending danger nearby. At LNK, two controllers were on duty with no supervisors at a late hour in the day. Tornado sirens sounded, an event that, according to controllers’ own orders, mandates the use of weather radios, radios and televisions to monitor the weather. But there was nothing in the tower to use. At DuPage, a tornado came within two miles of the tower. But controllers had no way of seeing it because heavy rains reduced visibility to a quarter of a mile. The controllers eventually evacuated when one controller received a personal call alerting him of the situation. The next day, the controllers notified the supervisor and stated that the radio that was in the tower, which management took away, would have alerted the staff sooner. The supervisor replied, "You should have looked out the window."
  
  Then, on December 25, 2006, a tornado roared within 150 yards of the Daytona Beach, Fla., Tower – with no warning given to the six controllers on duty who had their radio removed by the FAA – before carving a destructive path through Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Had the controllers had their radio, they would have received the tornado warnings that were broadcast to the public. At the time, the tower controllers were vectoring a Comair regional jet (Delta Connection) to the airport but, without any knowledge of the tornado embedded in the severe weather, could not warn the pilots. Fortunately, the aircraft landed safely, but, as the Daytona Beach News-Journal wrote in a Jan. 25, 2007 editorial:
  
  “Maybe the new (FAA) work rules are the FAA's attempt to pressure its employees. Maybe they're just work rules that may or may not survive the next contract. Either way, the ban on weather radios seems foolish. Controllers obviously should focus on their job. But safety is part of that job. The FAA can police how weather radios are listened to. Banning such radios, especially at airports in Florida, is going too far and defies intuitive safety measures.”

• At Boston Consolidated TRACON in Merrimack, N.H., a female controller was taken by ambulance to a hospital after falling down two flights of stairs as a result of being forced to wear dress shoes in direct contradiction to her doctor’s orders – delivered to BCT management – that she wear sneakers for medical purposes. BCT managers ignored the orders and imposed their dress code, prohibiting sneakers. As a result, she slipped and fell down the stairs. In a similar incident at New York Center, a female controller tripped, damaged her leg and broke her elbow after ZNY managers didn’t accept the validity of her medical certificate specifying her need to wear tennis shoes as a result of serious knee problem.

• At Caldwell, N.J., Tower, a supervisor, after consulting with the air traffic manager, denied a sick leave request for a controller who was scheduled for the 2-10 shift, claiming “operational necessity.” The controller, incapacitated and unable to come to work and perform his duties, was charged AWOL by the supervisor. Knowing one person would be left in the tower from 8 p.m. until closing the facility at 11 p.m., the supe decided not to call in overtime. The lone controller was not only responsible for all operational positions for those three hours but all administrative duties and supervisory responsibilities as well.

• At Fairbanks, Alaska, Tower, a controller, after calling in sick, was ordered to report for duty to complete a series of administrative tasks related to his ID card, which managers had failed to complete months earlier when the controller notified them of the impending expiration date. The controller risked not only his safety but that of the general public by driving while physically impaired by his illness. He then exposed his fellow employees to a highly contagious illness.

• At Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, the FAA pre-imposed work rules requirement for scheduling was to allow no later than an 11 a.m. shift start time on the third day of a controllers’ week, if the fifth day was a 10 p.m. mid shift. But ZID managers are now scheduling noon shifts and even 1 p.m., which results in a controller having shifts on their last three days of: Noon-8 p.m., 6 a.m.-2 p.m., and 10 p.m.-6 a.m. That’s 24 hours worked in a span of 42 hours.

• At New York-LaGuardia Tower, not long after starting a 4-12 shift, a controller informed his supervisor that he left his prescription eyeglasses in his car. The supervisor told the controller he was prohibited from leaving the building to go to the parking lot and retrieve his glasses, and instructed him to return to the tower cab – wearing the prescription sunglasses he had on – after his break. He was ordered to work local control and told he could perform CIC duties. He worked local control until the sun went down and then requested to be relieved from position after temporarily losing visual sight of a C206 which dropped off the radar on short final while two MD-80s were crossing the arrival runway. The supervisor then told the controller he was required to take leave to go get his glasses and return to work.

• At Tampa, Fla., Tower, just days after a controller was ordered by a supervisor to drop his pants to make sure they did not contain denim, another controller reported for an evening shift and put his dinner in the refrigerator. A supervisor entered the break room and performed a scheduled clean-out of that same refrigerator, which sat next to another refrigerator that was already full of controllers’ food as a result of prohibitions against leaving the facility to purchase meals. The controller’s dinner was thrown out. He went to the supervisor to plead his case. The supervisor then called the facility manager with the story and they decided the controller would not be allowed to walk outside the facility to get food. Controllers soon after retreated to a patio on break holding signs that read, “Controllers Need Food.”

A Look At Staffing Conditions In Selected States

CALIFORNIA

The 38 FAA air traffic control facilities in the state are authorized by the FAA to have a total of 1,624 controllers on staff. But currently, there are only 1,107 fully certified controllers working, with an additional 351 in training. NATCA has found that 92 controllers retired in FY06 and 33 have retired thus far in FY07, with an additional 303 – 27 percent – of the veteran controllers eligible to retire this year.

An example of a key airport control tower in the state that is suffering through the effects of understaffing is Los Angeles (LAX).

The effects of short staffing on safety are documented quite clearly at LAX.  From the fatal accident in 1991, throughout the decade of the 1990s, LAX was at or near the top of the national statistics on airport runway incursions.  During this time period, LAX was, by the FAA’s own written admission, in a Feb. 5, 2002 letter to NATCA from the facility’s FAA Air Traffic Manager, “critically short staffed.”  In the early 2000s, the FAA made a concerted effort to staff LAX tower to our historic authorized staffing numbers of between 47-50 controllers.  The result was a startling reduction in runways incursions and surface incidents, from 24 in 2000 down to only nine in 2004.  In fact, LAX went roughly two years and three months without one single controller error.  This was an unprecedented period of safety and staffing at LAX.  However, in the past few years the FAA has allowed staffing to drop back down to the 2000 level, around 35, and safety is once again a problem.  The weekend of February 24 and 25, 2007 saw two runway incursions and one near-mid-air collision. 

After staffing issues and controller fatigue were listed as probable causes of a near fatal runway incursion in the fall of 2004, the FAA put in writing that the safety and the efficiency of the air traffic system required it to add two extra night shifts, bringing the total to 13.  Since this time, staffing has dropped to the point that it has become mathematically impossible for the FAA to staff to these numbers.  A breakdown of this current year, from Jan. 1, 2007 until Feb 28, 2007, has revealed some alarming statistics: Despite averaging almost two overtime shifts per day, not one night shift began with the 13 controllers the FAA said it needed for safety.  Ninety-three percent of these night shifts began at least two controllers short.  Four of these shifts started with only nine of the required 13 controllers.  These are only the numbers for the night shifts. Similar problems exist on the day shifts. 

It is difficult to understand how the FAA allowed LAX to fall into this situation given the letters the agency has written to NATCA officials clearly stating there is a known link between safety and staffing.

As LAX controller numbers continue to dwindle, with seven controllers expected to retire this year, things are fast approaching the “critical” levels of the 1990s.  Since all other facilities in the Los Angeles area are also short-staffed and the new imposed pay scale would cost experienced controllers money to transfer here, LAX tower can expect to receive only raw, inexperienced trainees.  Without a concerted effort to attract experienced controllers and retain our current workforce, LAX will continue to lose controllers and that will mean flight delays, runway incursions and an increased chance of another fatal crash.

ILLINOIS

The 13 facilities in the state are authorized by the FAA to employ a combined 813 controllers to safely staff the system. Currently, however, there are just 657 fully certified controllers working. There have been 16 retirements thus far in FY07. Another 164 controllers can retire this year, offsetting gains of a possible 101 controllers that are currently in training.

MASSACHUSETTS

The four FAA air traffic control facilities in the state are authorized by the FAA to have 84 controllers on staff. But currently, there are 67 fully certified controllers working. Twenty-seven of these veterans are eligible to retire this year.

At Bedford Tower, an FAA supervisor on Feb. 27 posted the following report on conditions at the facility on a web chat board exclusively for supervisors:

“We have 2 people eligible to retire in the next 6 months. If either of them decides to do so, we will not be able to legally staff the facility during its hours of operation.  That's even with me working 10 hours a day 6 days a week like everyone else! This is simply a result of p*#ss poor planning on the part of the previous manager and the pathetic compensation package we are offering potential hires.

“We are severely short staffed and leave is not even a possibility. Overall, the outlook is dim.  The controllers here are overworked with the staffing needed to fill the schedule, train the developmentals, and never getting leave.  We have made job offers to CTI and military recruits, but the pay has been reduced to a laughable level so we are being turned down right and left.
 “Overall very discouraging, especially for those who want to move on in their careers.”

MISSISSIPPI

The three FAA facilities in the state are authorized by the Agency to staff 52 controller positions. But there are only 42 fully trained controller working today. Nearly one in four – nine total – are eligible to retire this year and 14 more could retire in 2008.

WEST VIRGINIA

The three FAA air traffic control facilities in the state are authorized to employ 63 controllers. But currently, there are just 45 on staff. Ten of those are eligible to retire this year and 10 more can retire in 2008.

CONCLUSION

The FAA currently is staffing to budget in its 314 air traffic control facilities. It is not staffing to traffic. That is why we are short 1,100 controllers from what we had working the system just over three years ago. In fact, the same FAA Air Traffic Organization official in charge of staffing is the very same official in charge of finance. That is a conflict of interest.

And contrary to Agency claims that an aggressive hiring spree will ensure full staffing and overcome the losses that have resulted from many more controllers retiring and leaving the workforce through other attrition reasons than the Agency ever expected, the simple fact of the controller training process suggests otherwise. It takes three years to fully certify a controller to work traffic alone. Therefore, the FAA is hiring trainees. It is not hiring controllers.

The bulk of the current veteran controller workforce was hired between 1981 and 1984, following the PATCO strike, and they are eligible to retire at age 50. Anyone could have seen this retirement swoon coming down the pike decades in advance.

Yet, when we look at the numbers, we see that the FAA only hired 13 controllers in 2004. But this year, the FAA is going to hire 1,100.

Conveniently, but we’re sure not coincidentally, the increased controller hiring is taking place after the FAA unilaterally imposed work rules and pay bands. A skeptic would argue that the FAA had its plan for how it was going to handle the staffing crisis: do nothing until the agency pushes through a new pay structure, and then fill the empty positions with cheaper labor.

By the FAA’s own admission, it miscalculated the detrimental effect the work rules would have on retirements and recruitment, and last month DOT Secretary Mary Peters has said that delays in the system could cost the aviation industry and the U.S. economy $22 billion a year.

We are faced with a similar staffing crisis in the nursing profession, as hospitals around the nation are struggling to get enough nurses trained and plugged into the system. A quick Google search pulls up federal and state efforts to provide incentives to recruit nurses into the profession.  Yet we’re dismayed that the FAA is actually doing everything it can to dis-incentivize recruits from joining the ranks as controllers while at the same time pushing the veteran controllers out the door towards retirement.

This approach is bad for our economy, bad for the safety of the flying public, and bad for the nation. 

We would like to return to the contract negotiating table with the FAA and fix this critical problem immediately before the margin of safety in our beloved National Airspace System is further compromised.

Facility by Facility Authorized Staffing Data (Excel Spreadsheet)